Who funds the defendant’s lawyers

Counterpoise reports each month on decisions of the DIFC Courts and the ADGM Courts, including court proceedings concerning DIAC and arbitrateAD arbitrations, together with developments at the two arbitration centres. This first issue covers decisions and announcements issued or re-issued between 1 August and 20 September 2026. Most of them turn on money, whether the question is who holds it, who pays for the litigation over it or whether a contract term that moves it will be enforced. Each item gives the facts as the source records them. Some add our reading of why the decision matters to anyone with money at stake in a UAE dispute.

Ella Rowles-DaviesEquipoise

Who funds the defendant’s lawyers

Two DIFC orders published in early September addressed related questions about the source of the money paying a defendant’s lawyers. When a defendant is subject to a freezing order, can the claimant find out where that money comes from? A judge of the Digital Economy Court, which sits within the DIFC Court of First Instance, ordered disclosure. Justice French, in a separate claim, dismissed the application.

Trafigura v Gupta (CFI 040/2025), order of 9 September 2026

Trafigura holds an English Commercial Court judgment of 30 January 2026. In the words of the DIFC order, that judgment required Prateek Gupta and his companies “to pay sums totalling more than USD 700 million”. As the order records it, Trafigura’s case in England was that it had been procured to pay more than $534 million for cargoes “represented in contractual and shipping documents as LME-grade nickel, but which turned out to be consignments of less valuable commodities.” In Dubai, the DIFC Court of Appeal granted a freezing order on 26 April 2025 against Mr Gupta and his wife, Ginni Gupta, who is not a defendant in England. Justice French describes it as “in the nature of what is called a ‘Chabra’ order granted against the Second Defendant”, so it reaches assets that Trafigura says she holds for her husband. Among the assets it covers is Villa K-01 on Frond K of the Palm Jumeirah.

H.E. Justice Robert French held that Trafigura had shown an arguable case that the Chabra criteria were met, which he called “the principal issue between the parties”. He continued the freezing order until 1 February 2027. He refused, as “too draconian”, Trafigura’s request to replace the notice regime with a ban on dealings without its consent or a court order. Instead, Ms Gupta must give Trafigura’s solicitors twenty-one days’ notice, not counting UAE weekends or public holidays, before any dealing with the Schedule D assets or certain dealings by Vision, together with an independent valuation, the buyer’s identity and a breakdown of how the proceeds will be used. Her application to discharge the interim order was dismissed with costs. She was also ordered to pay half of Trafigura’s costs of the variation application and of the application for interim relief, with costs to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed. The order of 9 September gave the parties 14 days to file brief submissions seeking a variation of the costs orders made in relation to the variation application.

Trafigura did not obtain an order for disclosure of how the defendants pay their lawyers in the DIFC. It had made that application as part of its variation application and had not pursued it at a hearing before the Chief Justice on 23 February, which on Trafigura’s account was because the issue was going before the English court. It came back before Justice French, who dismissed it. Among the facts it relied on, the order records Ms Gupta’s disclosure that the defendants’ source of litigation funding was Nomas Global Investments LLC. Trafigura also relied on the defendants’ declaration that they held no more than USD 65,000 in cash in their personal bank accounts, while their statement of costs for the jurisdiction hearing put the costs incurred or estimated at USD 520,650.82. Trafigura argued that it was “hard to envisage what legitimate, commercial rationale Nomas might have for providing such funding.” The court made no finding about Nomas or its funding. His reason was this:

“the application for disclosure in relation to legal funding is not demonstrated to have a sufficient connection to the protection of assets said to be held by the Second Defendant for the First Defendant to warrant the making of the order.”

Techteryx v Aria Commodities DMCC (DEC 001/2025), order of 1 September 2026, re-issued 8 September

H.E. Justice Michael Black’s order of 28 February 2025 granted a proprietary injunction over USD 456,000,000 transferred to Aria Commodities DMCC and its traceable proceeds, together with a worldwide freezing injunction up to the same value. The claimant has brought committal proceedings against Aria DMCC and Matthew William Brittain. On 10 August, on the claimant’s application alleging Aria DMCC’s non-compliance with a paragraph of the February order, the judge ordered Mr Brittain to swear an affidavit giving the amounts, dates and paying bank accounts of every payment made to Quinn Emanuel, Horizons, Gall, Campbells and FTI Consulting, together with “the ultimate sources of these payments”. The order of 1 September fixed 7 September as the deadline. The order also required Mr Brittain to explain the source of USD 1,083,912.49 paid by Aria Bio Industries FZE on 31 October 2025 towards Aria DMCC’s costs. On 25 August the judge had already amended his order on legal costs so that specified accounts could pay them without breaching the freezing order. That order made Rosenblatt, the solicitors instructed for the defendants, “as officers of the Court, the gatekeepers of the funds.”

On 26 August the judge adjourned the committal hearing, which had been listed for 1 September, for a third time. It is listed to be heard in person on 26 October 2026 over four days, with one counsel permitted to attend remotely. No finding of contempt has been made. The judge was blunt: “save in the most extreme circumstances (substantiated by strong evidence), no further adjournments will be granted.”

Our reading

In Techteryx the disclosure order came on an application to remedy non-compliance with the freezing order itself, made in the same order that dealt with the defendants’ legal costs. The 1 September order does not restate the reasons for granting it, although it describes what has been ordered as “disclosure of assets in order to police a freezing injunction”. In Trafigura the application was made under RDC 25.1(7). Justice French held that a sufficient connection between the funding question and the protection of the assets said to be held for Mr Gupta had not been demonstrated. In our view the two orders can be reconciled on a single question, which is whether the information helps the court police its own freezing order.

Trafigura shows that a funder’s name, once the funded party discloses it, can appear in a published DIFC order. The order names Nomas and also sets out the claimant’s challenge to the funder’s commercial reasons. We would expect a court that has already had to decide which money may pay for the defence, as in Techteryx, to look closely at the funding trail as well.

Arbitration awards in the DIFC Courts

Princeton v Persephone (ARB 015/2026 and ARB 027/2026), order of 14 August 2026

In an order that uses anonymised party names, H.E. Justice Mark Pelling set aside a majority award made on 19 January 2026 in a DIFC-seated arbitration under the DIAC Rules, in which the tribunal had found the seller of a cargo of ultra-low sulphur diesel liable to pay the buyer USD 18,493,065 plus interest and costs. He also set aside his own earlier order recognising the award and dismissed the recognition claim.

The seller’s case was that the majority had decided the dispute on issues that had not been pleaded or argued. The judge accepted that case, setting out the principle that governs a DIFC-seated arbitration in these words:

“It is fundamental to an arbitration seated in the DIFC that the parties should have a reasonable opportunity to submit evidence and make submissions on the issues between the parties that have led to the dispute that has been referred to arbitration.”

On whether the unargued points mattered, the judge said it was “not for this court to second guess what the Tribunal might have done” and that “It is sufficient that they might well have made a difference to the outcome.” He considered severing the offending parts of the award but found that those points formed “the foundation of the Tribunal’s conclusions”, so the whole award fell. Written submissions on costs were directed. Because the award fell for procedural unfairness, the court had no occasion to decide the underlying dispute between buyer and seller.

Pippa v Phineas (ARB 034/2026), order of 3 September 2026

H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke ordered an award debtor challenging a DIAC award to provide AED 300,000 as security for the award creditor’s costs of the set-aside application. Under the order, the challenge is stayed until the security is in place. The judge found unanswered prima facie evidence giving reason to believe that the award debtor could not pay costs if ordered to. He also relied on the award remaining unpaid and on the fact that “the Court has seen no evidence of assets against which the Award can be enforced”. If the security is not provided, the award creditor may apply to have the challenge dismissed, although dismissal is not automatic. In our view the order shows that an award debtor that has neither paid nor shown assets against which the award can be enforced may have to secure the other side’s costs before its challenge is heard.

In the DIFC Court of First Instance

Qatar General Insurance & Reinsurance Company QPSC v Emrgent Risk Solutions Limited [2024] DIFC CFI 053, judgment of 3 June 2026, re-issued 16 September

Qatar General Insurance & Reinsurance Company QPSC, a Qatari insurance and reinsurance company, engaged Emrgent Risk Solutions Limited to place retrocession cover for reinsurance it had written. The underlying insurance covered a shipyard in Qatar containing a superyacht facility, where a fire broke out on Sunday 11 August 2019. Yachts stored in the superyacht hall were treated as constructive total losses and that claim was settled for USD 33,368,285.00. H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani heard the trial from 26 to 29 January 2026.

At trial the claimant put its case on breach in two limbs. Its first complaint was that the broker failed to procure cover on the back-to-back terms sought, because the retrocession cover it obtained was subject to a cancellation notice that left the claimant uncovered in the second year. Its second was that the broker failed to say so. Both were accepted. She had “no hesitation in finding that the Defendant breached its Contractual Duty and Tortious Duty to the Claimant”. She ordered the broker to pay QAR 6,089,712.01 on the first head of claim, a sum the judgment describes as half of the claimant’s ten per cent share of that head, carrying compound interest at 9 per cent from 7 December 2020. The order further provides for the claimant to be indemnified by the broker for the broker’s half share of certain later payments it makes on the remaining heads of claim, with liberty to return to court on any dispute about that entitlement. In a separate order made on 12 August and re-issued on 16 September, the judge awarded the claimant its costs of the proceedings on the standard basis rather than the indemnity basis it had sought, with AED 4,342,386.59 payable on account within 14 days, together with AED 123,500 in immediately assessed costs of an earlier application.

In our view this decision speaks more directly than any other in the issue to anyone who buys cover through a broker. The loss was not the broker’s and the damages it must pay are a fraction of the underlying settlement, but the finding is that a broker which does not obtain the cover it was instructed to obtain and does not report the resulting gap may answer in damages for the loss its failure caused. The judgment also records the court taking subsequent events into account when assessing the claimant’s loss of chance, on a point it notes was argued only in bare terms.

Nitin Kedarnath Gupta v Rohit Kedarnath Gupta [2024] DIFC CFI 059, judgment of 19 August 2026

Kedarnath Gupta, who built KG International FZCO into a worldwide distributor of ball bearings from the Jebel Ali Free Zone, died on 9 December 2021, survived by his wife Asha and two sons, Nitin and Rohit. Earlier instruments had provided for both sons. A will of 2013 left his Indian assets to Nitin, his shares and stock to Asha and his remaining assets elsewhere to Rohit, while a DIFC Will of 2016 left the Dubai estate to Asha with substitute gifts of half to each son. The DIFC Will made in February 2021 left the whole estate to Asha with Rohit as substitute beneficiary and made no reference to Nitin. Probate was granted on 29 March 2022. The testator had suffered a major stroke on 17 September 2017 and spent six and a half weeks in hospital.

Nitin Gupta challenged the 2021 will on three grounds. They were that the testator lacked testamentary capacity, that he did not know and approve the contents of the will and, in the alternative, that its execution was procured by undue influence. H.E. Justice Robert French heard the trial from 5 to 16 February 2026 with closing submissions on 1 May. He dismissed the claim on all three grounds. The testator did not lack capacity for a disposition the judge described as simple. He understood the will and approved what it did. As to undue influence, the judge was “not satisfied that he was coerced into executing the Disputed Will”.

The judge was nonetheless critical of how the will was made. He described the process that led to its execution as “entirely unsatisfactory”. In his words the testator “should have had direct access to legal advice”. He added that a medical examination at the time of execution would have been appropriate as a matter of prudence. He also described as “patently false” a declaration furnished to the DIFC Wills Registry stating that the testator had drafted the will himself and had received no legal advice about it. The defendant’s involvement in preparing that declaration bore on the weight the judge gave his evidence.

The judge made no finding that the defendant knew the declaration to be false and no finding of dishonesty against him. On the judge’s own statement of the law undue influence required coercion or fraud. That ground failed, as did the challenges based on capacity and on knowledge and approval. No finding of undue influence was made against Rohit Gupta, against his wife or against Asha Gupta. Nitin Gupta was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs of the claim, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

In our view this decision has most to say to a family office. A DIFC Will made without independent legal advice and without a contemporaneous medical examination survived a challenge on three grounds. The simplicity of the disposition materially assisted the defendant, together with the evidence that the substance of the will had been explained to the testator, despite the unsatisfactory process by which it was prepared and executed.

In the DIFC Court of Appeal

Al Mheiri v Cameron [2025] DIFC CA 008, issued 1 September 2026

Khaled Al Mheiri sued John Cameron under an indemnity agreement dated 26 August 2015 covering his liability to Qatar National Bank on a loan taken for businesses in which both men had interests. He sought judgment for AED 91,250,000, which the judgment describes as “the asserted amount of his liability to QNB, minus AED 1,995,560” received from a co-defendant who settled. At first instance the judge dismissed the claim, holding that Mr Cameron was entitled to set the indemnity aside because he had signed it in reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations for which Mr Al Mheiri was responsible. Because the Court of Appeal set that finding aside, no finding of deceit against Mr Al Mheiri now stands while the question awaits retrial before a differently constituted court.

The Court of Appeal (H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, H.E. Justice Robert French and H.E. Justice Sir Peter Gross) allowed the appeal in part. It dismissed two of the six grounds and ordered a retrial before a differently constituted Court of First Instance, limited to whether Mr Cameron was entitled to set the indemnity aside for deceit or mistake. Mr Cameron must pay 85% of Mr Al Mheiri’s costs of the permission applications and the appeal, a figure the court reduced to reflect the grounds on which Mr Al Mheiri failed. The court set out the agreed translation of Articles 185 to 187, 190, 194 and 195 of the Civil Code because, in its words, “there are varying translations of the Code”.

Recording a concession by Mr Cameron’s counsel, the court said that the requirements of Article 185 “cannot be satisfied merely by establishing that a representation to the effect that something would happen in the future was made” and that the thing did not in fact occur.

The court added that a representation about the future can be falsified in other ways, for example where it carries an implied statement of a belief that the representor does not hold. The appeal succeeded because the judge had not made the findings of fact needed to support a conclusion of fraud, findings the Court of Appeal declined to make itself. Mr Cameron was ordered to plead the facts, the principles of UAE law and the reasoning on which he relies.

Al Buhaira National Insurance Company v Arab War Risks Insurance Syndicate [2026] DIFC CA 003, issued 10 August 2026

Al Buhaira National Insurance Company (ABNIC), a Sharjah insurer, wrote war-risk cover for the tanker M/T BETA with a sum insured of USD 70m. It reinsured the risk with the Arab War Risks Insurance Syndicate (AWRIS), a syndicate of more than 194 insurers from the MENA region, incorporated in Bahrain. The insured, Horizon Energy, said the BETA had disappeared. ABNIC obtained a DIFC judgment of 26 September 2024 avoiding the underlying policies, but Horizon’s own claim against ABNIC in the Sharjah courts had only been stayed. By the time of the trial Horizon had applied to lift that stay. At first instance, ABNIC obtained a declaration that the reinsurance contract carried a term, implied by UAE market custom, obliging AWRIS to indemnify ABNIC against “costs and expenses properly incurred in claims brought by or against the insured arising out of or in connection with the underlying policy”.

The Court of Appeal (Chief Justice Martin, Justice Sir Peter Gross and H.E. Justice Patrick Anthony Keane) set that declaration aside, holding that the implied term was inconsistent with the express terms of the contract and unreasonable. On reasonableness, it reasoned that if the custom applied to every reinsurance contract written in the region, Middle Eastern reinsurers would carry defence costs that their own retrocessionaires in London might have no notice of:

“The Court does not consider that the imposition of such a burden upon reinsurers merely because they write business in the Middle East is reasonable.”

ABNIC won on one of its grounds. The court declared that the reinsurance contract contains a term requiring the reinsurer to follow the decisions and settlements agreed between ABNIC and its insured. To create an issue estoppel, it also declared the trial judge’s findings that ABNIC had not breached any duty of good faith or fair presentation and that its claim was not time-barred. ABNIC abandoned two grounds and lost its argument that UAE law governs the reinsurance. Because ABNIC had abandoned its appeal on indemnity for the loss of the vessel and lost on defence costs, the court concluded that it “has not established any entitlement to indemnity under the Reinsurance Policy”. The court directed written submissions on liability for costs, including those of the first-instance proceedings (which the judge had assessed at AED 4,563,051.74).

In the ADGM Courts

Sowwah Square Investment v Forever Rose Retail [2026] ADGMCFI 0024, 3 September 2026

Sowwah Square, which holds and manages the Galleria Luxury Collection area of the Galleria Mall on Al Maryah Island, claimed AED 1,199,568.12 from a defaulting tenant. Of that sum, AED 207,413.39 was a late payment fee charged at three-month EIBOR plus eight per cent a year plus VAT. A further AED 337,743.94 was liquidated damages for holding over, charged at twice the tenant payments due immediately before the holding over. The tenant argued that both charges, which together came to AED 545,157.33 or 45% of the claim, were unenforceable penalties.

Justice Paul Heath KC, deciding the issue on the papers, found for Sowwah on narrow grounds. Because nobody appeared to argue the contrary, he declined to give the clauses “a stamp of approval” and decided the issue on the burden of proof. The tenant had filed no evidence of fact or expert opinion, so it could not show that either clause was an unenforceable penalty. He confirmed that the English test applies in the ADGM: “Cavendish Square now represents settled English law on the question of the circumstances in which a contractual payment will be regarded as an unenforceable penalty.” He added: “The threshold for interfering with the prima facie contractual agreement into which the parties have willingly entered is a high bar to cross.” The judge relied on unchallenged expert and factual evidence about Abu Dhabi leasing practice and the commercial standing of the parties, so in our view the result turns on that record. Because the tenant had opposed summary judgment on the penalty point and then did not take its opportunity to be heard at the trial of that issue, it was ordered to pay Sowwah’s costs of the summary judgment application on the indemnity basis.

The Birds Electro-Mechanical Contracting Company v SEG and RAK Properties [2026] ADGMCFI 0023, 7 August 2026

A mechanical and electrical subcontractor on the Julphar Residence Project on Al Reem Island obtained default judgment for USD 786,347.45 (AED 2,887,861) against both the main contractor and the developer, RAK Properties Co Public JSC, jointly and severally. RAK Properties was not a party to the subcontract and applied to set the judgment aside. The subcontractor relied on a “No Objection to Direct Payment Certificate” dated 19 April 2021. The subcontractor, the main contractor and the developer’s project consultant, Arkonsult, signed it, but RAK Properties did not.

Justice Heath refused to set the judgment aside. On the totality of the evidence, which included payments RAK Properties had made directly to the subcontractor in October 2020 and February 2021, he considered it “more likely than not that Arkonsult signed the document as an agent for RAK Properties”. RAK Properties had shown no real prospect of proving otherwise at trial. He also held that under English common law, which applies in the ADGM, “a non-party to a contract may nevertheless assume an enforceable obligation to perform something that it is not contractually required to do”, one of at least two bases on which the claim could succeed. The service objection failed as well. “Whether RAK Properties did or did not receive the email or WhatsApp message is not relevant to the question whether valid service has been effected.” In the judge’s words, “Arkonsult’s signature can be seen as RAK Properties’ approval of the arrangement.” The default judgment against the developer therefore stands. In our view the decision shows how a consultant’s signature, read with the project’s payment history and the surrounding correspondence, may provide sufficient evidence of the developer’s approval or agency to defeat an application to set aside a default judgment.

In brief

Opt-ins to the DIFC Courts. The DIFC Courts reported on 18 August that 243 of the 810 cases filed in the first half of 2026 (30%) came to the court by the parties’ agreement. Of those, 201 were in the Small Claims Tribunal and 42 were in the Court of First Instance, the Arbitration Division and the Digital Economy Court. The court says the opt-in cases in the Small Claims Tribunal, the Court of First Instance and the Digital Economy Court involved parties from 22 overseas jurisdictions. It also reports that nearly three quarters of opt-in arbitration cases related to arbitrations seated overseas.

Lombard lending. In EFG (Middle East) Ltd and EFG Bank Ltd v Marj Holding Limited and others [2025] DIFC CFI 029 (judgment of 27 July 2026, re-issued 8 September), H.E. Justice Roger Stewart entered immediate judgment for EFG Bank for EUR 4,218,152.13, USD 135,904.91 and GBP 11,107.90 plus interest against Marj Holding (sued as borrower under a Lombard credit facility) and Arj Holding (sued as corporate guarantor). Justice Stewart, who found no “realistic, as distinct from fanciful, prospect of establishing a defence”, also ordered an interim payment of USD 240,000 on account of costs. The application did not extend to Mr Juma, who is sued on an alleged personal guarantee.

Enforcement by share sale. In GTC Trading S.A. v Rashed (CFI 046/2023), Justice French refused on 21 August permission to appeal against his order of 30 January 2026 approving the sale of Mr Rashed’s shares in H.M.R. Investment Holding Ltd to City Mirror SPV Holdings Limited. He found that the first ground had no reasonable prospect of success and that “none of these Grounds has a reasonable prospect of success” among the remaining four.

Construction. In BAM Higgs & Hill LLC v Affan Innovative Structures LLC and another (CFI 106/2021), H.E. Justice Michael Black on 14 September refused the main contractor permission to appeal against the part of his February 2026 judgment requiring it to pay the cladding subcontractor AED 50,159,022.86 plus interest. The proposed appeal argued both that the subcontract did not let the subcontractor size its panels around a nominal 9m by 2.2m and that damages had been wrongly calculated. The judge held that grounds 3 to 5, on the variation, lacked a real prospect of success, as did grounds 6 to 12, which all raised issues of fact on quantum. He made no order on the subcontractor’s application for the contractor to pay AED 72,638,518.86 into court, treating it as moot, but gave liberty to restore it if the contractor renews its application before the Court of Appeal.

Unpaid legal fees. In Stephenson Harwood Middle East LLP v Mark AB Capital Investment LLC (CFI 009/2025), Chief Justice Wayne Martin, sitting in the Court of Appeal, refused on 10 August both a stay of execution and permission to appeal against a judgment for the firm’s claim of AED 2,893,362.66 plus interest and costs. Mark paid the first monthly invoice but none of the five that followed. As the order records, no complaint was made “at that time by Mark in respect of the amounts claimed in the invoices”. On the complaint that public relations and media work fell outside the retainer, the Chief Justice held that it was “entirely open to the Judge to conclude that Mark had acquiesced in the performance of the work”. Four days later, in Watson Farley & Williams (Middle East) LLP v Bin Otaiba Investment Group (CFI 086/2025), H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere refused the client permission to appeal against immediate judgment for the firm in the sum of USD 184,471.33 plus interest and against the dismissal of its counterclaim. Answering the argument that allegations of professional negligence should have gone to trial, he held that “The mere fact that a case involves allegations of professional negligence, breach of professional duty or other serious allegations does not preclude the grant of immediate judgment.”

Costs of pre-action production. In Jonathan Lau v Qashio Holding Company Limited and another (CFI 058/2026), H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere on 15 September gave the defendants permission to appeal on one ground alone, which concerns costs. Their argument is that RDC 38.65 sets a specific regime under which the person against whom pre-action production is sought is ordinarily entitled to the costs of the application and of complying with any order made on it, in place of the ordinary rule that costs follow the event. The judge held that the argument has a real prospect of success and was express that this is not a view on whether the appeal will succeed. He stayed the costs paragraph of the order under appeal and refused to stay the production obligations. No proceedings on the underlying dispute have been commenced and the court has made no finding of wrongdoing against either defendant.

Costs in employment claims. In BGC Brokers LP v Adam Tillman (CFI 038/2025), H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere on 21 August ordered that each party bear its own costs of a document production application, although he found the employer to be the more successful party on it and it had sought USD 171,332.40. Both sides accepted that the claim was an employment claim within Practice Direction No. 1 of 2025, whose paragraph 3.1 provides that each party bears its own costs. The judge recorded that the Practice Direction “departs from the ordinary rule in civil litigation that costs generally follow the event”. He declined to exercise the discretion in paragraph 3.2 to depart from it, holding that if substantial success alone sufficed, “the general rule would frequently be displaced and its practical effect significantly diminished”.

Sources

1. Trafigura Pte Ltd v Gupta, CFI 040/2025, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Robert French, 9 September 2026. difccourts.ae
2. Techteryx Ltd v Aria Commodities DMCC, DEC 001/2025, Amended Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Michael Black, 1 September 2026, re-issued 8 September 2026. difccourts.ae
3. Princeton v Persephone, ARB 015/2026 and ARB 027/2026, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Mark Pelling, 14 August 2026. difccourts.ae
4. Pippa v Phineas, ARB 034/2026, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke, 3 September 2026. difccourts.ae
5. Qatar General Insurance & Reinsurance Company QPSC v Emrgent Risk Solutions Limited [2024] DIFC CFI 053, Amended Judgment of H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani, 3 June 2026, re-issued 16 September 2026. The judgment header reads QSPC and the costs order reads QPSC. difccourts.ae
6. Qatar General Insurance & Reinsurance Company QPSC v Emrgent Risk Solutions Limited, CFI 053/2024, Amended Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Sapna Jhangiani on costs, 12 August 2026, re-issued 16 September 2026. difccourts.ae
7. Nitin Kedarnath Gupta v Rohit Kedarnath Gupta [2024] DIFC CFI 059, Judgment of H.E. Justice Robert French, 19 August 2026. difccourts.ae
8. Al Mheiri v Cameron [2025] DIFC CA 008, Court of Appeal (Chief Justice Wayne Martin, Justice Robert French and Justice Sir Peter Gross), 1 September 2026. difccourts.ae
9. Al Buhaira National Insurance Company v Arab War Risks Insurance Syndicate [2026] DIFC CA 003, Court of Appeal (Chief Justice Wayne Martin, Justice Sir Peter Gross and Justice Patrick Anthony Keane), 10 August 2026. difccourts.ae
10. Sowwah Square Investment Sole Proprietorship L.L.C. v Forever Rose Retail Limited [2026] ADGMCFI 0024, Justice Paul Heath KC, 3 September 2026. assets.adgm.com
11. The Birds Electro-Mechanical Contracting Company v SEG and RAK Properties Co Public JSC [2026] ADGMCFI 0023, Justice Paul Heath KC, 7 August 2026. assets.adgm.com
12. DIFC Courts, press release of 18 August 2026 on first-half 2026 opt-in cases. difccourts.ae
13. EFG (Middle East) Ltd v Marj Holding Limited [2025] DIFC CFI 029, Justice Roger Stewart, 27 July 2026, re-issued 8 September 2026. difccourts.ae
14. GTC Trading S.A. v Rashed, CFI 046/2023, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Robert French, 21 August 2026. difccourts.ae
15. BAM Higgs & Hill LLC v Affan Innovative Structures LLC and another, CFI 106/2021, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Michael Black, 14 September 2026. difccourts.ae
16. Stephenson Harwood Middle East LLP v Mark AB Capital Investment LLC, CFI 009/2025, Order with Reasons of H.E. Chief Justice Wayne Martin, 10 August 2026. difccourts.ae
17. Watson Farley & Williams (Middle East) LLP v Bin Otaiba Investment Group, CFI 086/2025, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere, 14 August 2026. difccourts.ae
18. Jonathan Lau v (1) Qashio Holding Company Limited (2) Armin Moradi Tosarvandani, CFI 058/2026, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere, 15 September 2026. difccourts.ae
19. BGC Brokers LP v Adam Tillman, CFI 038/2025, Order with Reasons of H.E. Justice Rene Le Miere, 21 August 2026. difccourts.ae

This note reports and comments on public court decisions and publications. It is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. Anyone whose position may be affected by a decision reported here should take advice from a qualified practitioner in the relevant jurisdiction.